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Exploring the 'Free-Corruption Zone' Award using the Theory of Change among the Indonesian National Police: A Case Study of Gowa Resort Police

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ABTRACT
The current study aimed to address the nature of the programme of the "Free-Corruption Zone" Award, and whether the competition lessened the corruption. The study employed a qualitative method using exploratory approach on Gowa Resort Police. The Gowa Resort Police was selected as it had already been granted the 'Free-Corruption Zone' Award twice. The collected data were interviews, legal regulations, and state documents. The evaluation were carried out by doingsurveys contain the supporting and field components. The results yield that the inadequency of socialisation occurred, and a deterioration became barriers to the success of the competition. Further, the study offered recommendations according to the diagnosis tree and the Theory of Change to be engaged later by the INP, the MABR, and other public sectors.

Keyword: Corruption, Free-Corruption Zone Award, Public Sector, the Indonesian National Police, Theory of Change.

1. INTRODUCTION

There are diverse definitions of corruption coined by many experts, jurisdictions, and statutory authorities. Defining the word itself needs a lot of references such as regulations, handbooks, and journals. One of the scholars, Langseth (2006), he defines corruption into several types, namely bribery, extortion, embezzlement, illegal levies, theft and fraud, abuse of dicretion, active, passive, narrow, and enormous corruption, and other varied types of corruption. Bac (1998), further classifies corruption to be two kinds: personal or grouped. Referring to illegal levies, the condition engage with a patron and a receiver, the act of handing over stuff to improperly affect decisions. Other type which is the abuse of discretion is manipulating power to earn individual benefit (Langseth, 2006). Pointing to

Law number 31, 1999, on Corruption Eradication Comission (KPK), corruption is usually categorized in severalmodes: gratuities, extortion, bribery, country economic losses, fraudulent acts, and embezzlement in institutions (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1999, 2001). Further, these modes of corruption are subclassified in two modes: the solitaries that can promote in order to earna personal and is destructive to country economy, and the ones that provoke to personal's gain in the absence of intervention with the country's economic matters.

2020 was a hard year for Indonesia, after a period of gradual improvement in struggling against corruption (Transparency International, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021). Respectively, based on survey administered by Indonesian Survey Institute; the most corrupt institutions

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in Indonesia are the INP, the courts, and public servants (Komara, 2019). In the case of INP Annual Report, 139 units out of 1416 working units have been awarded the "Free-Corruption Zone" Award (ASRENA POLRI, 2020). Yet, the outputs are equivocal, additionally it appears to lip-service look alike, instead a real transformational program: The corruption lies in the INP unfortunately still rifes. As a matter of fact, combating corruption become the nation's biggest target (Setyawan, 2018). This notion is confirmed based on the outcomes of the Task Force for Eliminating Illegal Levies. In this case, during the task force's Operation Caught Red-handed, 181 police personnels were apprehended (SatuanTugas, 2021). Society's views to the INP is disrupted by the extensive illegal actions, which includes anything from shady service fees to high-level extortion schemes which threaten the regulations (Kompas, 2020; CNN, 2021).

With respect to the establishment of the competition the "Free-Corruption Zone" Award, the program established from the official proclamation of an organization to raise the zone and attain awards according to the integrity agreement(MENPAN-RB, 2019). As its purposes are thoroughly occupiedin the Indonesian public sectors, the MABR adressess decrees related to the program. Figure 1 represents the framework of the program and required qualifications.

Figure 1, shows that every police working unit which desires to work out the "Free-Corruption Zone" Award ought to perform several phases, beginning from the requirement stage and finishing in the assessment stage. Starting from the first phase, the police working unit needs to encounter an investigation held by the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia, even further, they have to obtain a certain authorized indicator related to their economicrecords. The second phase obligates these units to inquire proposals. For example, before reaching the Head-

quarters in Jakarta, the Gowa Resort Police (where is being examined in the current study) should submit the proposal to South Sulawesi Local Police. Next, the Headquarters provides approvals for the police unit so that they will enable to pass to the next phase(s). Next is the third phase where the police unit to execute the indicators authorized by the Ministry. In this stage, note that there is set a minimal score to pass every indicator. One condition that needs to be done by the police unit is to publicise to all staff and subordinates that they have saterted the establishment of a Free-Corruption Zone. The message isdelievered through social broadcast, roll calls and any considerable broadcast and publishing. In the fourth phase, it involves the Assessment team who is grouped between Internal Assessment Team (TPI) and National Assessment Team (TPN) to score the police units' efforts determined from the indicators. Additionally, the government provide their staff to be examiners as the Internal Assessment Team according totheir region. While the National Assessment Team comprises of the Ombudsman staffs, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and MABR. The last phase is to vote if the unit fits the qualifications. If it fits the qualifications, then the reward is released. Then the "Free-Corruption Zone" awardee belongs to the unit (MENPAN-RB, 2019; ASRENA POLRI, 2021). In brief, this can be viewed as an incentive system to promote morale and welfare of the National Police personnels. This is expected so that they do not engage with illegal levies, and are able to implement the best service. Therefore, this study aim to elaborate the practice of the "Free-Corruption Zone" Award, along with its disputes that may impede the competition to accomplish its greatest result in repeling illegal practices in the INP. The study highlights and explores the benefits and shortcomings of the program, while also suggesting various approach to lessen corruption in the INP.

Figure 1. **The process to Accomplish the "Free-Corruption Zone" Award**

Source: MENPAN-RB, 2019; ASRENA POLRI, 2021

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPO-THESIS

Theory of Change

Valters (2014, p.4) affirms The Theory of Change to represent endless critical reflection, urging a fundamental shift towards better learning in advancing practice and thinking. Generally, the approach comprises why and how any intervening action works. The approach offers the applicant to observe and explore continuous improvement, and adapt the progresses according to the truth and the changing that happens. Contrarily, Morra-Imas and Rist(2009) suggest the practice of the approach, proposing this must elaborate 1) the procedure begins from the inputs to predicted results and effects, 2) the environments' conditions and settings 3) the presumptions that forms alternative considerations and effects, and 4) according to these assumptions, the applicants then are promoted to examine the judgments. The Theory of Change is exhibited in Figure 2.

As shown in Figure 2, there are several issues consist of inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, impacts, and in every stage, the assumption(s) can arise. Concisely, Inputs are the first element while The Activities contains actions seen as interferences. The Outputs element are categorized in authentic and vague as product of the award program, andthe Outcomes element indicate to any benefit which practice are planned to carried out. The Impacts are the vital points of the plan. The last is assumptions which is the tentative expectations. It exists in every indicator probably as a speculation of conceivably ensuing (*Guided Example: Project Superwomen*, 2004; Morra-Imas and Rist, 2009; Valters, 2014).

Not only fruitful, nevertheless, the ideology also provokes deficiencies. Supported by James (2011) who considers public tend to only pay attention to a particular issue, so it is kind of complicated to apply thetheory as a core of continuous progress. Stated before, thetheory needs an introductory matterto be drafted prior before deciding the intrusions which have to be carried out, since a different beginning pointsurely arises the need for divergentapproaches. In this study as a case, the only folk who will rise the intrusions are the ones who own power in the institutions and ministry concerned in the development of the "Free-Corruption Zone" program with purposes to scrutinize, probe, and determine the root of the troubles, and the proper solution to alleviate some issues (James, 2011; Valters, 2014).

Figure 2. **The Theory of Change**

Source: Morra-Imas and Rist, 2009; Valters, 2014

The Diagnosis Tree

Young (2019) claims that the diagnosis tree illustrates an approach to discover a real matter starting from the bottom until the top within its step by step. He asserts which this is mandatory to look for a tangible problem that is issued as a tangible society interest which is previously feasible to analyse the real matters. Still pointing out by Young, the next step, remains asking 'Why?' on each issue to comprehend more around the actual causes. Undoubtedly, it is crucial to stay concentrating on the tangible public problems which is previously concerned and acknowledged. So, it envolves to be essential to critically review and opt the matters progressively. Figure 3 comprises a diagnosis tree.

Figure 3, depicts the real matters are not actually a definite matter as it has associated with different issues. This even considers such as iceberg ideology where one can watch the iceberg from the top until its bottom, the extensive effort has to be made. The impetus the society appear to feel uncertain about particular problems is due to the core of the problems are not tangible: this is occurring in the relevant organizations, both inside and outside. Accordingly, implementing the framework in the recent research would be fruitful, with intention to analyze and opt the matters which the ministry are encouraged to fix in communal organizations, especially in the Indonesian National Police.

Methods to Decrease Corruption

Decreasing the illegal levies, some organizations apply a gentle method by providing incentives. To decrease the chance to corrupt, the tough method would be rising supervision or merging those approaches by offering performance-based pay; and provoking sharp reprimands if the personnels is apprehended doing illegal levies. Burgess and Ratto (2003), in the UK government, they describe the practice of performance-based pay, which is performed in the private sector. This notion has provoked the commitment to create clean government and enhance performance by offering incentives. Prysmakova and Vandenabeele (2020) investigated Poland and Belgian Police Agents related to the effect of the incentives is task fulfilment. These incentives is found to have a facilitative effects iwhen they handle cases. That is to say, the incentives are precisely harmonious to gain staffs' performances.

On the other hand, a current research in China examined by Zhu (2012), revealed that overcoming the corruption by executing a grievous penalty, since corruption seen as an monetary violation. To punish, the civic institutions' staffs who are apprehended in extortion potentially be sentenced around five to ten years, and undergo the death penalty in spite of continuous arguments because of its altercation and benefit as a hindrance

aftermaths (Miao, 2016; Nopriandi and Ardhiansyah, 2020). The nation has penalized death thousands of corrupt defendants. Regarding the reality which the execution of extreme castigations is transversely varied among states, some statesfound in China, in reality- enforce varied detention period of time. In Japan, as an example, the penalties are forfeit and confinement. In the US, there could be a fine, confinement and discharge from office. While in Mexico, specifically the punishment can start from three to 2 years of confinement along with a forfeit 300 times of their daily income, and a work discharge.

3. METHODS
Research Design
Cited in Biggam (2015), Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 2)reported that qualitative approach builds outcomes. The researcher in this recent study has set two research questions coming from his wish to study how, and what is happening as an outcome of the award among INP. Using a case study, the researcher would like to reveal conditions in a narrow region which is Gowa Resort Police. Still in Biggam (2015), this notion is confirmed by Cohen and Manion (1995: 106) that reaching an in-depth comprehension about particular area is best to use a case study.To collect the data, the writer was on duty in the INP but at the time this research going on, he took a study leave. That is to say, the writer is an insider as affirmed by Holian and Coghlan (2013). Nevertheless, the consents of ethics had been fulfilled. The INP experts, through reform, was expected to accelerate the institution. In Holian and Coghlan (2013), Coghlan and Brannick (2010) note that the threefundamentals during the research process which were owned by the insider such as pre-understanding, double roles, and conducting bureaucratic politics.All of these components could be considered as assets to obtain more proficiency than an outsider, yet the writer ought to be objective. Therefore, while investigating the study, it was esential for the writer to be able to reveal how the competition determination exists among the INP.

Data Collection and Analysis
The interviews were conducted to collect the primary data to grasp better comprehension of the regulations. These interviews involved were fivemembers from the INP HQ, Gowa Resort Police, and MABR based on their rank and position. To conductthe credible data, the method should be prepared by great composition,as approved by Biggam (2015). The arrangement involves preparing the interviewees and the interview questions to be delivered to them. While doing the interviews, the semi-structured interviews

Figure 3. **Adopted and Portrayed**, **The Abstract Diagnosis Tree**

Source: Data Processed

were delivered. This is in order to administer precise and coherentstated from all the participants. Cited in Brinkmann (2015a, 2015b), Svenn and Brinkmann (2008, p.3) declare the use of the interview is to get broad elaborations, and having chances to describedifferent views.

Referring to the secondary data, some legal documents and state regulations such asthe performance assessment indicators of Peraturan Menteri Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi Nomor 10 tahun 2019were adopted by the Ministry to value the suitability to work out the programme. In addition, the writer also administered theGowa District Police Annual Evaluation Analysis archivessince 2017 to 2021 which were already provided on the state website. The qualitative analysis consists of collecting and transcripting data, and interpreting the writer's encounters (Biggam, 2015). To analyse the data, the writer applied three phases: condensing data, displaying data, portraying and verifying conclusions as clarified by Miles, Huberman and Saldaña (2014).

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Findings and Analysis
Focusing on Gowa Resort Police case, the main aim of the award programme was to facilitate bureaucracy and lessen the illegal levies practices which happens among public sectors. It turns into an issue of how the "Free Corruption Zone" is granted. After mentioning the procedures to enrol with the competition, therefor, below is presented how the reward is granted.

The Indicators
Overall, the indicators are grouped into supporting components which score is 60%, and the rest 40% is called field components. The supporting components has six elements which each element represents its own percentage. Starting from the first element, this is called the management of change which scores 8% of the 60% of the supporting components. The element has goals to regularly adjust the pocedures of task, and to improve bothideology and culture of each staffin the work task. Moreover, MENPAN-RB (2019) and ASRENA POLRI (2021), state that this element deals with the organization of the work unit before engaging the programme, the creation of a developing strategy, monitoring and evaluation procedures.

Referring to the aspect, the chief of Gowa Resort Police in this case, which is also a proof that the work head team commander, takes an essential part as a role model by demonstrating his dedication to his staff while competing (Marlina, et al., 2020). Furthermore, all police personnel should be committed to reforming the environment, which is characterized by red tape and the possibility for abuses of authority. In this connection, I1, who is employed at the Gowa Police Resort, stated, "..the head of the Gowa Police Resort must always be actively involved in the formulation of the program and offer examples for staff to prevent corrupt things."

The second aspect, known as governance management, accounts for 7% of supporting components (60%). This aspect's goal is to increase the performance of the system by creating a clear standard protocol. Furthermore, this entails utilizing modern technology for delivery of services to satisfy social requirements (MENPAN-RB, 2019; ASRENA POLRI, 2021). With technologies, the community needs information sharing. Thus, the INP has nothing to hide, resulting in trustworthy personnel delivering assistances.

The third element scores 10% of the supporting components namely changing to the HR management system. In the current sense, Gowa Resort Police is anticipated to put personnels in any positions according to aptitude and competency, allowing officers to be more transparent about their status, as declared by MENPAN-RB (2019) and ASRENA POLRI (2021). The goal of the notion is to increase the professionalism of the INP, which means that no longer should any personnelhas a chance to pay their superior for a positioning strategy. I1 provided an

example of this indicator: "...positioning employees based on merit, not favor or hate, in those other words, encouraging professionalism."

The fourth aspect scores 10% of the supporting components. This aspect is called enhancing work accountability. Acording to MENPAN-RB (2019) and ASRENA POLRI (2021), the rule is based on the assumption that involving commanders related to their employees' actions will minimize the desire to take illegal levies. Furthermore, the participation stimulates the Gowa Resort Police chief to comprehend the preparation and supervising stages. Furthermore, the Gowa Resort Police Department ought to have a detailed outline for planning and oversight.

The fifth indication is enhancing supervision, which accounts for 15% of the supporting components (60%). This feature will encourage Gowa Resort Police to launch an anticorruption public campaign and engage the Gowa Resort Police supervision team in supervising and punishing those who make illegal levies (MENPAN-RB, 2019; ASRENA POLRI, 2021). This includes internal oversight and the record of a complaint from the residents of Gowa about police personnel who receive illegal levies. In response to this, I1 stated, "...it is still the duty of the head since if the head is not active, there is a deviation potential in operations and expenditures."

The sixth aspect is enhancing public quality of service, which accounts for 15% of the supporting components. This aspect necessitates the establishment of the service's standard protocol and educating all employees on how to cope with customers who demand outstanding service from the police resort (MENPAN-RB, 2019; ASRENA POLRI, 2021).

A field aspect of the evaluation is collected via surveys has scores 40% of the total. These surveys are classified such as the scores of corruption views and the quality of service views. The former one is assessed by an internal evaluation team, and the latter one is assessed by the external team (MENPAN-RB, 2019; ASRENA POLRI, 2021). Regarding this, I4 stated, "...the ministry grants the power to the headquarters of INP to conduct a survey on individuals who come to police officers and seek for services." The survey, on the other hand, is unclear and frequently concealed. I3's statement confirms this assertion: "...it is closed, not transparent." As a result, the results of the survey are only available to the MABR, and participants in this program are not aware of the results. Furthermore, it poses the issue of discovering the failure, whereas understanding the failure might be a signal to better later on.

Theory of Change Analysis

The writer attempted to identify the connection between this program and the expectation to minimize corruption during this research. The figure in Appendix 1 shows the inputs, actions, outputs, results, and impacts based on the regulation and the aims of the Ministry. Furthermore, this initiative is one of the numerous government interventions to reduce illegal levies inside the public sector by providing incentives and awards given to police personnels whose work units have favorably met the provided objectives.

According to Appendix 1, the researchers selected the topic of 'high illegal levies rate' as the foundation for organizing this program. The inputs include establishing the "Free Corruption Zone" Award, the awarding of a performance allowance to successful work units, and the establishment of the "Free-Corruption" Award. The work unit must meet the indications as mentioned above (MENPAN-RB, 2019). The Ministry's intended results include the work unit's ability to modify its work mechanism, mentality, and culture. Furthermore, again in performance and efficiency, quality can be regarded as a primary output. The output achieved by the recipients will result in a performance allowance and reward from the Ministry. In response to

the award, I2 stated, "...the work unit will get a certification of achievement from the MABR and the 'Free Corruption' Award."

With those changes, the MABR is optimistic that it will be able to reduce the possibility and purpose to conduct illegal levies and enhance the anti-corruption culture and monitoring, resulting in an increase in the INP's public quality of service. The impact will become an increase in the life quality of INP officers, and hence a reduction in the use of illegal levies in the INP. The MABR's assumptions are based on the premise that because officers already get a reward, they would be undoubtedly prone to charge illegal levies when serving as community sector personnels.

In terms of presumptions, the performance allowance and the reward are judged enough for properly implementing the intervention. However, there is a significant gap amidst the perspectives and presumptions of the interviewees. Concerning the remuneration, I3, who has previously worked for the Gowa Resort Police, stated, "...the agreement was an increase in compensation." Our reward will be greater than the norm. But the truth is that there isn't anything." Whereas I1 convinced: "...all Gowa Resort Police officers received incentives from the Ministry of Finance. Second, we received an internal budget boost as a result of the 'Free-Corruption' Award for the criminal investigation." In addition, I4 stated that "...those who received the prize are handed directly to its top commander (Kapolri) if wish to honor them, the MABR has still not organized, nor intervened so far."

In terms of incentives, the incentives remain unbalanced. As an example, one respondent stated that it would be rewarded after receiving the prize; however, Ministry personnel stated that it was not their duty. The remark from I1 is reinforced by a Ministry of Finance rule and the head of the INP (KepalaKepolisian RI, 2020; MENPAN-RB, 2020). This is to say, the socialization of the real goal and reward is not effectively carried out. Furthermore,

I2 stated, "...the INP can no longer provide monetary prizes to operating units that get this ZI... It was suggested that I focus more on professional development." This is more evidence that the socialization of this program is not being communicated widely, even though socialization is listed as one of the stages that must be completed first in the regulations (MENPAN-RB, 2019; ASRENA POLRI, 2021). I3 also stated, "...we were compelled to adapt, yet there was no prize from the superior, only a certification, what is that certificate for?" If the reward is not more than the number of illegal levies taken someday, police personnel will keep accepting them (Prabowo, Hamdani, and Sanusi, 2018).

Going on to the second assumption, greater monitoring as a result of the implementation of the program will eliminate the possibility and intent to take illegal levies. There are also differing viewpoints on this assumption. Beginning with thenotion, I3 assumed: "...there is a supervisory component in the indicators, if somebody is discovered performing illegal levies, they must be punished." In the same lines, I5 stated, "...the more people that are overseeing, the better the program will work." Nonetheless, the MABR I4 personnel continued to think that the internal staff of each work unit was sufficient to manage. An Internal Affairs division (Propam) and a supervisory team comprise the internal supervision team (Siwas). These two supervisory teams, however, are not always sufficient.

In reality, these teams are typically made up of police officers whose rank is lower than that of the people being investigated. In other ways, the INP maintains its hierarchical culture, making it hard for employees to consult with their employers when any goes wrong. In this context, I5 stated: "...it must still require the internal sector, such as the Internal Affairs division (Propam), general supervision inspectorate (Itwasum), and investigative oversight for CID (Bagwassidik), and for the external, it could be the legislative

body, House of Representatives (DPR), National Police Commission (Kompolnas), and also the mass media."

Going on to the differences in views between both the Ministry's major objective and the police officers' main purpose, I4 concluded that the Ministry wants the program to be institutional change. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of some police personnels, it was merely a fictitious responsibility: they fulfilled it only to fulfill their obligations, yet to effect genuine changes. I3's statement supports this notion: "...but after he (the Chief) was mutated and substituted, well, the successor did not grasp and understand, it would remain stagnant." "...most faults or cause of working unit failure is because, one, a leader failed to express his concern to his organization...," I5 assumed. It will not be the failure of the program; this will be the commander's failure! If the leader doesn't really change, then is just no longer leader!"

Nonetheless, the members' lack of knowledge creates a problem, leading to the free-rider issue (Burgess and Ratto, 2003). Members who have a thorough understanding of the program will make every effort to complete it. Some other members, on either hand, would be free riders. This is a foregone conclusion. As a result, the commander is not the only element to examine. As previously said, it might be due to the Ministry's lack of socialization.

Moreover, I4 believes that as time passes, this program will continue to learn and improve. "We, as a member of the Ministry, will always enhance the mechanism of reform following the times," he stated. It demonstrates that this application is not completely capable of resolving current issues. This program's dynamic developments may also be seen in the numerous amendments made (MENPAN-RB, 2019).

The Diagnosis Tree
This event might be considered one of Indonesia's anti-corruption measures. According to Rumelt (2011), an ineffective tactic might arise if the leader cannot choose the proper targets and approaches. As a result, he argued that a comprehensive investigation is conducted in order to set a

Figure 5. **The Diagnostic Tree Analysis**

Source: Data Processed

target with crystal clear rules as a technique and constant response (Mintzberg, 1987; Kaplan and Norton, 2000; Joyce, 2015). The researcher used the diagnostic tree to try to figure out what was causing the problems.

The Fraud Triangle Theory was coined by Cressey (1950) (quoted in Machado and Gartner, 2017) to highlight the major reasons why people commit fraud. The approach will be utilized in this article to investigate the critical causes why police officers accept illegal levies while getting prizes and incentives. The origins of this paradigm are three: pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. This framework changes through time, and Wolfe and Hermanson (2004), claimed that pressure, opportunity, rationalization, and additional competence are the major causes of accepting illegal levies. Despite its name, the fraud hypothesis shares parallel with the INP officer's example, in which the subject is an internal employee; as a result, the researchers will employ a framework that includes competence as a consideration.

To begin, pressure is a force that pushes an actor to do things that are not in line with their responsibilities and obligations, including financial or non-financial concerns (Abdullahi and Mansor, 2015). Parental pressure, bribery for the position, bribery for promotion, leader's force, and disappointments are the five causes. Parental pressure might be increased when they have demands that aren't supplied by monthly earnings. Thus a police officer may request illegal levies (Davies, Buttle, and Meliala, 2014). In a similar line, Quah (2020b, p.137) backs up the evidence of bribery for positions and promotions. In truth, many police officers still pay to achieve their desired job, with bribes ranged from £500 to £20,000 (Quah, 2020b). How can they earn abundant of money when their pay is just £250 to £750 each month? (PresidenRepublik Indonesia, 2015, 2019). During their everyday work, asking for illegal levies has become the only option they have. In fact, poor salaries

are why cops take illegal levies (Lindner, 2013).

Opportunities might sometimes lead to the imposition of unlawful taxes. According to Cohen and Felson (1979), a violation or crime can be committed when three conditions are met: a potential perpetrator, a suited target, and the lack of a skillful guards (Miró, 2014). Police officers are a good analogy for a likely offender. The individuals who anticipate the service may be compared to an appropriate objective, and the guardian can be compared to the monitoring team. In those other statements, the leaders' lack of supervision would then allow their employees to seek illegal levies (Abdullahi and Mansor, 2015).

Then there's rationalization, which is the ability for an actor to justify illegal levies by inventing a plausible rationale (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004; Abdullahi and Mansor, 2015). For example, suppose someone is applying for a driver's license and requests a police officer to speed up the procedure with a shortcut. In that case, the assumption will be that the officer is assisting that individual. As a result, receiving money above what it should cost is acceptable. Or it could be as simple as the desire to appear as excellent as other policemen (Davies et al., 2014).

On the other hand, public tolerance becomes a concern, as actual data shows that people will indulge illegal levies if they make administrative policies easier (Quah, 2020a). Similarly, the lengthy process for reporting corrupt police personnel makes public more tolerant (Zakariya et al., 2019). In this regard, I3 added, "...society still tolerates the illegal levies, which has become the norm." Moreover, it seems that, because of the INP's insufficient resources, officials are occasionally forced to fund demands that the government does not meet with their own funds (Quah, 2020b). This might lead to the conclusion that asking for illegal levies is unimportant if the significance of work is at risk.

This element might suit a particular position in terms of competence, particularly with officials who have the power to do actions that no other individual could accomplish in the same way (Abdullahi and Mansor, 2015). "Limitless power is prone to corrupt the brains of those who wield it," William Pitt (1759-1806) observed of authority. "Power tends to corrupt, and ultimate power corrupts absolutely," Lord Acton (1834-1902) famously remarked. Capacity or power, as one commentator put it, tends to influence the individuals in those positions. If it's depicted as someone stepping through a door, the chance is what opens it, and rationalization is what motivates that person to boldly walk through all of it (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004). On the other hand, Capability permits the actor to repeatedly request unlawful fees (Mackeviius and Girinas, 2013). That might arise due to the officers' lack of integrity, oversight, and lack of discipline for those detected. "Illegal levies that can not be done is a systemic illegal levy," I5 said in response to here. The connotation is systematic, such as when the police had a deposit culture in the past. So, commanders, the chief of police very certainly receives a deposit from their unit commanders, who obtain illegal levies from a variety of sources..." That shows that one's status influences the potential of illegal levies.

5. CONCLUSION

This study concluded that this approach is not ideal for addressing illegal levies since it lacks socialization and includes excessive leadership participation, which is continually changing. The improvements that are being introduced must be long-term and institutionalized. Next, there is a perceived gap between the Ministry and the INP about the program's goal. As a result, each party's true goal would be diverse. Furthermore, the program's implementers have not thoroughly examined the core of the issue that leads to police officers asking illegal levies. The actual difficulties

highlighted by this project include a lack of merit-based promotion selection, insufficient INP funding, low penalty, monitoring, and low pay. As a result, this program is intended to deal with those issues. The "Free Corruption Award" and a performance allowance, on the other hand, have failed to lower the corruption level. Nevertheless, when contrasted to the INP's 400,000 members, others argue that the discovery of 121 police officers pursuing illegal levies is disproportionate. Yet, it really should be emphasized that the data was obtained from the INP's internal staff. Therefore, its objectivity may be questioned.

The current report exposes varied thoughts from each participant yet the crucial point is that all police personnel should be committed to reform clean and free corruption environment. However, the 'Free-Corruption' Award appears to be failing to uncover actual concerns and solutions, as evidenced by many reports exposing police personnel to conducting illegal levies. The result yield that these participants still observed wages, staff ignorance, bad leader influence, insufficient INP funding, low penalties, oversight, a lack of socialization and merit-based advancement occurred in the INP. The illegal levies in the INP reached 181 cases as confirmed by SATGAS SABER PUNGLI (2021). To achieve the goal of creating the clean and free corruption environment, one notion coming from the participant that the Gowa Police Resort must always be actively involved in the program in order to be role model for his personnel. It should be done since the culture in the INP, starting with the problem of the presence of opportunity.

For individuals who continue to seek illegal levies, the program should evaluate signs of a suitable punishment. As a result, the prize and discipline will be evenly distributed because this intervention was created to combat corruption. It is critical to eliminate all chances for illegal levies, considering people are often willing to take them due to a lack of monitoring and

a lack of penalty. As a result, regardless of who committed it, the stakeholders must negotiate collaboration on external oversight and the appropriate sanctions to be enforced. For example, the Ombudsman, the National Police Commission, the KPK, a non-governmental organization, or even a representative from the media are not just to punish them but also to serve as a deterrent to those still considering it. It does, however, need extra effort to ensure that external and internal monitoring authorities do not overlap in their responsibilities. Also, the incentive for an outstanding work unit might be related to the reason they accept illegal levies, such as professional advancement or promotion opportunities. As a result, other work units must be willing to adjust as well.

This article has several drawbacks. For starters, one of the study's shortcomings was distance. Because of their geographical location, the respondents experienced considerable time discrepancies: six hours in Jakarta and seven hours in South Sulawesi. Kara (1999) points out that doing interview using the internet and crossing time zones is not something that everyone is eager to do. To counter the issue, the writer scheduled the participants' optimal work period, such as around their lunch breaks, which meant it was around dawn in Birmingham. Second, it isnot easy to obtain unbiased sources while researching a large public sector organization. Nonetheless, the writer attempted to look at the problem through as many lenses and viewpoints as possible, whether in Indonesia or in other nations where the concerns of this study were discussed. Third, this paper does not provide the detail the indicators; instead, it outlines which indicators are set before receiving an award.

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
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Appendix 1. **It is Called Analysis by Theory of Change**

Source: Data Processed